In Meditations II Descartes argues that even if the Evil Demon is deceiving him about everything else, it cannot be deceiving him about one thing - that he exists. As long as he is doubting everything, he is thinking, and as long as he is thinking, he must exist. Cogito, ergo sum. I think, therefore I am; or: I am thinking, therefore I exist. If the demon tricked him into thinking he didn't really exist, he could reason his way out of the trickery, for if he is doubting his own existence, he is surely thinking. Something is thinking, and that which thinks is the "I".
Clearly, Descartes is making the assumption that thoughts require a subject to think them, something that isn't itself a thought but which in some sense is aware of the thoughts. Is he entitled to assume that thoughts require a thinker? If we think he isn't then his argument fails, for all he'd be left with is "There are thoughts". In any case, he does seem to be assuming that the subject of the thoughts is a continuing thing, subsisting from one thought to the next, and from one kind of mental process to the next (doubting, imagining, etc). He is not entitled to do this, for this could be an illusion created by the demon. But without this continuing "I", his argument looks much weaker: a fleeting "I" that exists only momentarily, as each separate thought occurs, would not be able to reason. It could not form the cogito argument, nor be the subject of clear and distinct ideas, for it would not be able to linger on them long enough to check they really are clear and distinct.
Perhaps you disagree with me, or have your own arguments against Descartes. Get posting!
Tuesday, 22 September 2009
The Method of Doubt and Its Purpose
Descartes begins by adopting the position of a global sceptic. He wants to doubt everything because he wants to get back to the foundations of all knowledge in order to build science up from principles that are absolutely certain. He needs to doubt all his previous beliefs because he suspects that some of them are false; if some are, all might be, and therefore all subsequent beliefs would by insecure. He thinks that knowledge has to be certain, indubitable. He sets the standards for knowledge very high - perhaps too high, certainly for everyday purposes, but he is interested in the foundations of scientific knowledge, so perhaps it is reasonable to set very high standards. However, he doesn't live up to those standards himself. Before long he is trusting any ideas that are "clear and distinct", which is not the same as ideas that are indubitable.
Also, Descartes seems to confuse certainty with conviction. Just because you have a strong conviction that a belief is true, it doesn't follow that it is certainly true. He thinks certainty can come from a kind of rational insight (clear and distinct ideas), but this is different from an idea being logically certain.
Descartes' doubt is universal. He is questioning all his beliefs, not individually but by questioning the principles they rest on. For example, any belief based on trusting perception is undermined by the first wave of doubt. It is hyperbolic: extreme, over-the-top, absurd (eg the Evil Demon) - but it has to be like this because it has to get into all the corners of his usual ways of thinking.He must not allow himself to slip back into his habitual attitudes.
First Wave: Doubting the Senses
In the past Descartes has been deceived by his senses. Distant things appear small, for example. However, such perceptual illusions don't undermine all perceptions, he says. They aren't usual (they wouldn't be illusions if they were), and they can often be explained. In fact, Descartes could perhaps have gone further. There are good reasons for doubting all our perceptions in so far as we cannot be sure that the actual world is as it appears to be to us (but this point concedes that there is an actual world distinct from our perceptions).
Second Wave: The Argument from Dreaming
Descartes is a man, so he sleeps and has dreams. Sometimes his dreams are ordinary, sometimes extraordinary. But "there are no conclusive signs by means of which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep". So, how can he be sure that what he takes to be the real world, when he is awake, isn't actually a dream? He could be dreaming that he is sitting by the fire in his dressing gown, holding a piece of paper.
One response to this is that genuine perception is more coherent than dreams are and that we can usually tell when we are awake and when dreaming; but of course we could simply be dreaming that we can tell the difference! Another response is that the concept of dreaming depends on the concept of real perception, just as the concept of fake money depends on there being genuine money. If everything was a dream, would we be able to talk about dreams and reality? Personally, I think we could, because we would be dreaming that there was a dream world (within the dream-reality) and a "real" world (also within the dream-reality), so I think we could still have versions of the two concepts. Also, Descartes doesn't really need to prove that everything is or could be a dream, only that we can't know when we are dreaming and when we are awake. It is the correct application of the concepts that he is sceptical about.
But dreaming doesn't undermine all Descartes' beliefs. Even in dreams a square has four sides, 2+3 = 5, etc. So he introduces his secret weapon.
The Third Wave: The Evil Demon
What if our minds were controlled by a powerful and malignant demon who wants to deceive us about everything? Then everything would be thrown into doubt. I couldn't be sure anything I experience or think is real. The demon controls all my experience, perceptions, thoughts. He could be deceiving me even about mathematics and geometry, and about apparent features of objects such as shape, location and extension.
So Descartes now doubts everything. But somehow he has to get out of this global scepticism in order to establish a firm foundation for knowledge, but how? He has dug himself a deep hole!At present he does not know a single thing.
Also, Descartes seems to confuse certainty with conviction. Just because you have a strong conviction that a belief is true, it doesn't follow that it is certainly true. He thinks certainty can come from a kind of rational insight (clear and distinct ideas), but this is different from an idea being logically certain.
Descartes' doubt is universal. He is questioning all his beliefs, not individually but by questioning the principles they rest on. For example, any belief based on trusting perception is undermined by the first wave of doubt. It is hyperbolic: extreme, over-the-top, absurd (eg the Evil Demon) - but it has to be like this because it has to get into all the corners of his usual ways of thinking.He must not allow himself to slip back into his habitual attitudes.
First Wave: Doubting the Senses
In the past Descartes has been deceived by his senses. Distant things appear small, for example. However, such perceptual illusions don't undermine all perceptions, he says. They aren't usual (they wouldn't be illusions if they were), and they can often be explained. In fact, Descartes could perhaps have gone further. There are good reasons for doubting all our perceptions in so far as we cannot be sure that the actual world is as it appears to be to us (but this point concedes that there is an actual world distinct from our perceptions).
Second Wave: The Argument from Dreaming
Descartes is a man, so he sleeps and has dreams. Sometimes his dreams are ordinary, sometimes extraordinary. But "there are no conclusive signs by means of which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep". So, how can he be sure that what he takes to be the real world, when he is awake, isn't actually a dream? He could be dreaming that he is sitting by the fire in his dressing gown, holding a piece of paper.
One response to this is that genuine perception is more coherent than dreams are and that we can usually tell when we are awake and when dreaming; but of course we could simply be dreaming that we can tell the difference! Another response is that the concept of dreaming depends on the concept of real perception, just as the concept of fake money depends on there being genuine money. If everything was a dream, would we be able to talk about dreams and reality? Personally, I think we could, because we would be dreaming that there was a dream world (within the dream-reality) and a "real" world (also within the dream-reality), so I think we could still have versions of the two concepts. Also, Descartes doesn't really need to prove that everything is or could be a dream, only that we can't know when we are dreaming and when we are awake. It is the correct application of the concepts that he is sceptical about.
But dreaming doesn't undermine all Descartes' beliefs. Even in dreams a square has four sides, 2+3 = 5, etc. So he introduces his secret weapon.
The Third Wave: The Evil Demon
What if our minds were controlled by a powerful and malignant demon who wants to deceive us about everything? Then everything would be thrown into doubt. I couldn't be sure anything I experience or think is real. The demon controls all my experience, perceptions, thoughts. He could be deceiving me even about mathematics and geometry, and about apparent features of objects such as shape, location and extension.
So Descartes now doubts everything. But somehow he has to get out of this global scepticism in order to establish a firm foundation for knowledge, but how? He has dug himself a deep hole!At present he does not know a single thing.
Wednesday, 16 September 2009
Matrix
I have never seen the Matrix before (shock horror) but i am fairly sure this is a good example of what to expect - watch out for something in this video that Graeme shall surely be saying in a lesson soon...
Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJDrpJhTycs
(having trouble with the link, so either click on post name or copy and paste link to browser)
Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJDrpJhTycs
(having trouble with the link, so either click on post name or copy and paste link to browser)
Tuesday, 21 July 2009
Summer Holiday Task
A small task for you to do before the start of next term. Read Meditation 2 and makes sure you really understand the cogito argument. Then write a paragraph or a page about whether it is a good argument. Does it work? You could do some research to see what other people say about this. There's no doubt that at first sight it seems fine. But does it assume the very thing it is attempting to prove?
Feel free to comment or to add a post about this or any other topic. Enjoy your holiday. See you in the new school.
Feel free to comment or to add a post about this or any other topic. Enjoy your holiday. See you in the new school.
Thursday, 16 July 2009
End of Term
I will be back in school on Monday (July 20th) and we will have a lesson - in fact, the last lesson of the year. Please be there. (Also Literature in the afternoon.) Please return your AS textbooks if you haven't already done so. Thanks.
Saturday, 13 June 2009
Descartes: task (and Meditations 2)
This is work for you to do this week. We miss a lesson on Monday and two on Wednesday, when I am not in, so this is for you to have completed by Thursday, and we will discuss it in the lesson.
Task: Read Descartes' first Meditation in the post below and then write a summary of it, concentrating on the three waves of doubt and how they lead into each other.
Don't worry if you find this hard. You'll have plenty of chances to understand it thoroughly. But do your best with the summary. Of course, you could discuss this between yourselves and help each other by adding posts or comments.
In Meditation 2 Descartes escapes from the hyperbolic doubt he has talked himself into and establishes his first certainty - that he exists (the cogito). Clicking on the post title above will take you to Meditations 2 - in case you'd like to check it out.
Descartes
MEDITATION I.
OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY DOUBT.
1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions], and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions.[ L][ F]
2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false--a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach; but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor; but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested.[ L][ F]
3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.[ L][ F]
4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt; as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in my hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty; or clothed [in gold] and purple when destitute of any covering; or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant.[ L][ F]
5. Though this be true, I must nevertheless here consider that I am a man, and that, consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping, and representing to myself in dreams those same things, or even sometimes others less probable, which the insane think are presented to them in their waking moments. How often have I dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming.[ L][ F]
6. Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming, and that all these particulars--namely, the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the forth- putting of the hands--are merely illusions; and even that we really possess neither an entire body nor hands such as we see. Nevertheless it must be admitted at least that the objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations which could not have been formed unless in the likeness of realities; and, therefore, that those general objects, at all events, namely, eyes, a head, hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really existent. For, in truth, painters themselves, even when they study to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and extraordinary, cannot bestow upon them natures absolutely new, but can only make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if they chance to imagine something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is at least certain that the colors of which this is composed are real. And on the same principle, although these general objects, viz. [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and the like, be imaginary, we are nevertheless absolutely necessitated to admit the reality at least of some other objects still more simple and universal than these, of which, just as of certain real colors, all those images of things, whether true and real, or false and fantastic, that are found in our consciousness (cogitatio),are formed.[ L][ F]
7. To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal nature in general and its extension; the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort.[ L][ F]
8. We will not, therefore, perhaps reason illegitimately if we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the other sciences that have for their end the consideration of composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these are really existent, contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable: for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does it seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of falsity [or incertitude].[ L][ F]
9. Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God who is all powerful, and who created me, such as I am, has, for a long time, obtained steady possession of my mind. How, then, do I know that he has not arranged that there should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing, nor figure, nor magnitude, nor place, providing at the same time, however, for [the rise in me of the perceptions of all these objects, and] the persuasion that these do not exist otherwise than as I perceive them ? And further, as I sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived each time I add together two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form some judgment still more simple, if more simple indeed can be imagined? But perhaps Deity has not been willing that I should be thus deceived, for he is said to be supremely good. If, however, it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this is permitted.[ L][ F]
10. Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing certain. But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless, in whatever way it be supposed that I reach the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect ) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To these reasonings I have assuredly nothing to reply, but am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to be true of which it is impossible to doubt, and that not through thoughtlessness or levity, but from cogent and maturely considered reasons; so that henceforward, if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false.[ L][ F]
11. But it is not sufficient to have made these observations; care must be taken likewise to keep them in remembrance. For those old and customary opinions perpetually recur-- long and familiar usage giving them the right of occupying my mind, even almost against my will, and subduing my belief; nor will I lose the habit of deferring to them and confiding in them so long as I shall consider them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions to some extent doubtful, as I have already shown, but still highly probable, and such as it is much more reasonable to believe than deny. It is for this reason I am persuaded that I shall not be doing wrong, if, taking an opposite judgment of deliberate design, I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for a time, that all those opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at length, having thus balanced my old by my new prejudices, my judgment shall no longer be turned aside by perverted usage from the path that may conduct to the perception of truth. For I am assured that, meanwhile, there will arise neither peril nor error from this course, and that I cannot for the present yield too much to distrust, since the end I now seek is not action but knowledge.[ L][ F]
12. I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these; I will continue resolutely fixed in this belief, and if indeed by this means it be not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, viz, [ suspend my judgment ], and guard with settled purpose against giving my assent to what is false, and being imposed upon by this deceiver, whatever be his power and artifice. But this undertaking is arduous, and a certain indolence insensibly leads me back to my ordinary course of life; and just as the captive, who, perchance, was enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the darkness that will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised.
OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY DOUBT.
1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions], and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions.[ L][ F]
2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false--a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach; but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor; but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested.[ L][ F]
3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.[ L][ F]
4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt; as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in my hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty; or clothed [in gold] and purple when destitute of any covering; or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant.[ L][ F]
5. Though this be true, I must nevertheless here consider that I am a man, and that, consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping, and representing to myself in dreams those same things, or even sometimes others less probable, which the insane think are presented to them in their waking moments. How often have I dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming.[ L][ F]
6. Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming, and that all these particulars--namely, the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the forth- putting of the hands--are merely illusions; and even that we really possess neither an entire body nor hands such as we see. Nevertheless it must be admitted at least that the objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations which could not have been formed unless in the likeness of realities; and, therefore, that those general objects, at all events, namely, eyes, a head, hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really existent. For, in truth, painters themselves, even when they study to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and extraordinary, cannot bestow upon them natures absolutely new, but can only make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if they chance to imagine something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is at least certain that the colors of which this is composed are real. And on the same principle, although these general objects, viz. [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and the like, be imaginary, we are nevertheless absolutely necessitated to admit the reality at least of some other objects still more simple and universal than these, of which, just as of certain real colors, all those images of things, whether true and real, or false and fantastic, that are found in our consciousness (cogitatio),are formed.[ L][ F]
7. To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal nature in general and its extension; the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort.[ L][ F]
8. We will not, therefore, perhaps reason illegitimately if we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the other sciences that have for their end the consideration of composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these are really existent, contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable: for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does it seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of falsity [or incertitude].[ L][ F]
9. Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God who is all powerful, and who created me, such as I am, has, for a long time, obtained steady possession of my mind. How, then, do I know that he has not arranged that there should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing, nor figure, nor magnitude, nor place, providing at the same time, however, for [the rise in me of the perceptions of all these objects, and] the persuasion that these do not exist otherwise than as I perceive them ? And further, as I sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived each time I add together two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form some judgment still more simple, if more simple indeed can be imagined? But perhaps Deity has not been willing that I should be thus deceived, for he is said to be supremely good. If, however, it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this is permitted.[ L][ F]
10. Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing certain. But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless, in whatever way it be supposed that I reach the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect ) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To these reasonings I have assuredly nothing to reply, but am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to be true of which it is impossible to doubt, and that not through thoughtlessness or levity, but from cogent and maturely considered reasons; so that henceforward, if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false.[ L][ F]
11. But it is not sufficient to have made these observations; care must be taken likewise to keep them in remembrance. For those old and customary opinions perpetually recur-- long and familiar usage giving them the right of occupying my mind, even almost against my will, and subduing my belief; nor will I lose the habit of deferring to them and confiding in them so long as I shall consider them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions to some extent doubtful, as I have already shown, but still highly probable, and such as it is much more reasonable to believe than deny. It is for this reason I am persuaded that I shall not be doing wrong, if, taking an opposite judgment of deliberate design, I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for a time, that all those opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at length, having thus balanced my old by my new prejudices, my judgment shall no longer be turned aside by perverted usage from the path that may conduct to the perception of truth. For I am assured that, meanwhile, there will arise neither peril nor error from this course, and that I cannot for the present yield too much to distrust, since the end I now seek is not action but knowledge.[ L][ F]
12. I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these; I will continue resolutely fixed in this belief, and if indeed by this means it be not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, viz, [ suspend my judgment ], and guard with settled purpose against giving my assent to what is false, and being imposed upon by this deceiver, whatever be his power and artifice. But this undertaking is arduous, and a certain indolence insensibly leads me back to my ordinary course of life; and just as the captive, who, perchance, was enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the darkness that will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised.
Saturday, 30 May 2009
Exam Essay
Dear Students
In your exam essays please remember to select examples and to evaluate (criticise) as well as describe. For example, if you were asked to "assess hard determinism", you should spend a third of the essay describing what it is, then a third giving some examples that clarify what it is and its implications, then a third on a series of coherently linked criticisms - before reaching a conclusion that clearly answers the question. You cannot score very well if you don't evaluate the arguments. You can counter-counterargue the counterarguments, of course.
Good luck. I am in school on Monday if you want to ask anything.
In your exam essays please remember to select examples and to evaluate (criticise) as well as describe. For example, if you were asked to "assess hard determinism", you should spend a third of the essay describing what it is, then a third giving some examples that clarify what it is and its implications, then a third on a series of coherently linked criticisms - before reaching a conclusion that clearly answers the question. You cannot score very well if you don't evaluate the arguments. You can counter-counterargue the counterarguments, of course.
Good luck. I am in school on Monday if you want to ask anything.
Tuesday, 26 May 2009
Free Will Revision
Dear Students
Is anybody out there? I have added three posts to help you with Free Will and Determinism revision. Please ask questions, respond, or just grunt. Any sign of life would be welcome. Don't just read. You must make notes and put things in your own words.
Questions: Is free will compatible with determinism? What are the implications of Hard Determinism? What are the attractions and problems associated with Libertarianism?
Also, any feedback on the first exam would be welcome. I wasn't in last Friday and don't even know what the questions were.
Is anybody out there? I have added three posts to help you with Free Will and Determinism revision. Please ask questions, respond, or just grunt. Any sign of life would be welcome. Don't just read. You must make notes and put things in your own words.
Questions: Is free will compatible with determinism? What are the implications of Hard Determinism? What are the attractions and problems associated with Libertarianism?
Also, any feedback on the first exam would be welcome. I wasn't in last Friday and don't even know what the questions were.
Free Will: Implications
If we accept Hard Determinism we have to face up to some pretty serious implications. It could change the way we think about morality and personhood.
If the causes of our actions are beyond our free control, does this mean their consequences are not our responsibillity? And would this mean that we shouldn't be punished for them? Morality is about "oughts" and "shoulds", and determinism is about "coulds". We could not have acted differently, so we had no real choice. What we ought to have done, or should not have done, doesn't come into it. So is it part of Hard Determinism that morality as well as freedom is illusory? I don't blame a fallen branch for scratching my car, so why should I blame a youth who couldn't have acted other than how he did?
But we could argue that morality is compatible with determinism. We have been exposed to morality - it is part of the cultural influence on us - so it has gone into the complex mix of factors that determine our actions. Blaming and the threat of punishment are factors that our desires etc respond to and which become part of the causal process. We may resist an action as the result of a second-order desire not to want the pain of punishment or shame. This is supported by the point that we do distinguish between sane adults who restrain their basic desires and animals, children, the mentally ill, who may not. Mind you, this is not to say that punishment is actually fair, because determinism still means that ultimately your character has been formed by factors outside your control.(Although as Chris pointed out, fairness may not be a concept that we should be allowed to use if morality had been undermined by Hard Determinism.)
Even so, we may think that this unfairness is a price we have to pay for keeping society safe and orderly through our systems of morality, law and punishment. In other words, determinism forces on us a practical rather than moral justification for our social practices.
But do we want to explain morality away, as science explains magic away, so that we feel we don't need it anymore? Or do we want to insist that moral blame is ineliminable, too fundamental to get rid of? For example, would you like to see scientific defences extended in court cases to such an extent that people can be excused any crime they were "caused to commit" eg by drugs, alcohol, junk food, low self-esteem, genetic inheritance, poor upbringing, peer pressure, etc?
Would it not be dehumanising to lose the notion of holding peple responsible for their actions? Peter Strawson argues that if we can't hold people responsible for their actions, we can't think of them as objects of our "reactive attitudes" such as gratitude and resentment. You can't resent, or be grateful for, a mere mechanical reaction. To treat people as people rather than as medical cases or as machines means to respond to them with such attitudes. To treat everyone objectively, without personal feelings, would be to dehumanise them. Strawson goes so far as to argue that even if science showed that free will is an illusion, the concept of freedom or autonomy is so fundamental that we simply could not eliminate it. Proving Hard Determinism true would not change a thing. If it did, society would unravel, come apart. Do you agree with Strawson?
But it is not only morality that would be affected by Hard Determinism. It could be seen as undermining rationality too, by suggesting that actions should be explained or accounted for in terms of causes rather than reasons, intentions, purposes, etc. And moral responsibility is not the only kind. We are also considered to be responsible rationally, for our beliefs and reasoning. It is irresponsible, for example, to hold two beliefs which contradict each other.
Why are you reading this now? What kind of answer does that question expect? One in terms of the physical causes that led up to you reading this, or one in terms of your reasons? I don't care about the mechanical causes; I want to know about the rational motives. This explanation would refer to things in the future, your aims and ambitions, rather than past events. Causal explanations look backwards; they explain the how but not the why. We need to see people as rational beings, with the freedom to make considered choices, not as blind bundles of mechanical atoms.
Also, we need to see actions in a social context - in what Wittgenstein called a "form of life" - or in the context of a particular "game", with specific rules and purposes. Exactly the same body movement becomes a different action in the context of a football game from what it is in the context of a fight, and therefore it needs a different explanation, one which connects with the context, the rules and purposes. This is a rational explanation rather than a causal one. A causal explanation would be missing something.
So we have two different stances on human actions/behaviour. The Intentional Stance sees us as persons with free will, as responsible for our actions, participating in various "games" for various purposes. The Mechanical Stance sees us a bodies, subject to the laws of nature, whose behaviour can be explained in terms of causes, scientifically. The question then is: Can the Intentional Stance be eliminated. Can we reduce all rational explanations to causal, scientific ones.
Of course, desires can be seen as both reasons and causes, but a cause has a law-like status. If A causes B, A will always cause B if the circumstances are the same. So we would have to show that a certain desire was always caused by a certain brain state and that it always had the same consequences when circumstances were precisely the same. If this were possible we might be able to see desires as both causes and reasons. Both could explain my behaviour in different ways without being in competition.
The Intentional Stance is one we are likely to adopt towards any very complex system with complex mechanisms and outputs - eg organisations, some animals, computers. Not just people. So that suggests it has a useful function even when genuine freedom is not really an issue.
.
If the causes of our actions are beyond our free control, does this mean their consequences are not our responsibillity? And would this mean that we shouldn't be punished for them? Morality is about "oughts" and "shoulds", and determinism is about "coulds". We could not have acted differently, so we had no real choice. What we ought to have done, or should not have done, doesn't come into it. So is it part of Hard Determinism that morality as well as freedom is illusory? I don't blame a fallen branch for scratching my car, so why should I blame a youth who couldn't have acted other than how he did?
But we could argue that morality is compatible with determinism. We have been exposed to morality - it is part of the cultural influence on us - so it has gone into the complex mix of factors that determine our actions. Blaming and the threat of punishment are factors that our desires etc respond to and which become part of the causal process. We may resist an action as the result of a second-order desire not to want the pain of punishment or shame. This is supported by the point that we do distinguish between sane adults who restrain their basic desires and animals, children, the mentally ill, who may not. Mind you, this is not to say that punishment is actually fair, because determinism still means that ultimately your character has been formed by factors outside your control.(Although as Chris pointed out, fairness may not be a concept that we should be allowed to use if morality had been undermined by Hard Determinism.)
Even so, we may think that this unfairness is a price we have to pay for keeping society safe and orderly through our systems of morality, law and punishment. In other words, determinism forces on us a practical rather than moral justification for our social practices.
But do we want to explain morality away, as science explains magic away, so that we feel we don't need it anymore? Or do we want to insist that moral blame is ineliminable, too fundamental to get rid of? For example, would you like to see scientific defences extended in court cases to such an extent that people can be excused any crime they were "caused to commit" eg by drugs, alcohol, junk food, low self-esteem, genetic inheritance, poor upbringing, peer pressure, etc?
Would it not be dehumanising to lose the notion of holding peple responsible for their actions? Peter Strawson argues that if we can't hold people responsible for their actions, we can't think of them as objects of our "reactive attitudes" such as gratitude and resentment. You can't resent, or be grateful for, a mere mechanical reaction. To treat people as people rather than as medical cases or as machines means to respond to them with such attitudes. To treat everyone objectively, without personal feelings, would be to dehumanise them. Strawson goes so far as to argue that even if science showed that free will is an illusion, the concept of freedom or autonomy is so fundamental that we simply could not eliminate it. Proving Hard Determinism true would not change a thing. If it did, society would unravel, come apart. Do you agree with Strawson?
But it is not only morality that would be affected by Hard Determinism. It could be seen as undermining rationality too, by suggesting that actions should be explained or accounted for in terms of causes rather than reasons, intentions, purposes, etc. And moral responsibility is not the only kind. We are also considered to be responsible rationally, for our beliefs and reasoning. It is irresponsible, for example, to hold two beliefs which contradict each other.
Why are you reading this now? What kind of answer does that question expect? One in terms of the physical causes that led up to you reading this, or one in terms of your reasons? I don't care about the mechanical causes; I want to know about the rational motives. This explanation would refer to things in the future, your aims and ambitions, rather than past events. Causal explanations look backwards; they explain the how but not the why. We need to see people as rational beings, with the freedom to make considered choices, not as blind bundles of mechanical atoms.
Also, we need to see actions in a social context - in what Wittgenstein called a "form of life" - or in the context of a particular "game", with specific rules and purposes. Exactly the same body movement becomes a different action in the context of a football game from what it is in the context of a fight, and therefore it needs a different explanation, one which connects with the context, the rules and purposes. This is a rational explanation rather than a causal one. A causal explanation would be missing something.
So we have two different stances on human actions/behaviour. The Intentional Stance sees us as persons with free will, as responsible for our actions, participating in various "games" for various purposes. The Mechanical Stance sees us a bodies, subject to the laws of nature, whose behaviour can be explained in terms of causes, scientifically. The question then is: Can the Intentional Stance be eliminated. Can we reduce all rational explanations to causal, scientific ones.
Of course, desires can be seen as both reasons and causes, but a cause has a law-like status. If A causes B, A will always cause B if the circumstances are the same. So we would have to show that a certain desire was always caused by a certain brain state and that it always had the same consequences when circumstances were precisely the same. If this were possible we might be able to see desires as both causes and reasons. Both could explain my behaviour in different ways without being in competition.
The Intentional Stance is one we are likely to adopt towards any very complex system with complex mechanisms and outputs - eg organisations, some animals, computers. Not just people. So that suggests it has a useful function even when genuine freedom is not really an issue.
.
Free Will: Libertarianism and Compatibilism
There are two main challengers to Hard Determinism.
Libertarians include dualists who, like Descartes, believe the mind is a non-physical substance (spiritual) and is therfore not subject to laws of nature - it is essentially free.
The problem with this is how to account for the interaction of the physical body and the non-physical mind. If we want the mind to cause the body to behave in a particular way (eg pick up the pen), how does the mental message connect with the physical body? Through the brain? OK, but that doesn't help: the brain is still physical. Likewise, in reverse, how can bodily events (accidents) cause a mental event (pain)? Surely only two physical things or events can interact causally.
Also, there is plenty of evidence that mental events depend on the physical brain. If we damage our brains, we can lose certain mental abilities, even consciousness. Then there's the problem of God. Dualism claims the mind is non-physical, spiritiual, supernatural. This implies God, and God is omniscient, which means He must know what we are going to do in the future, which means it must already in some sense be determined, pre-destined. So there is a question mark over Dualism's ability to deliver genuine freedom.
Libertarians aren't all substance dualists, so the problems with Dualism don't affect all kinds of Libertarianism. But all kinds must put some constraints on our freedom to act, for two reasons. 1) We need to act consistently rather than totally randomly in order to have a unique character, personality, identity. 2) We need our actions to be determined, or at least influenced, by rational considerations - reasons for choosing A rather than B. You could argue that for any particular decision, there is always just one most rational option, so the more rational we are, the more we are determined (influenced) by the compulsions of rationality. Does this mean that very rational and intelligent people are in some ways less free than others?
One interesting attempt to produce a radically Libertarian philosophy was Jean-Paul Sartre's Existentionalism (1940s/50s). Our existence precedes our essence. Infact we have no essence, no essential characteristics. We choose our own natures. We are 100%responsible for our lives. We are nothingness, not confined or defined by human nature. But we suffer from "bad faith", the illusion that we are fixed, determined in various ways. We fear responsibility, we are made giddy by our freedom. Existensionalism, like all forms of Phenomenology, starts from the cogito (I think, therefore I am): what's most certain is that I exist, rather than that matter and the laws of nature exist. Our starting point should be our freedom, not physics.
The trouble with this is that most of us do feel that we have some kind of nature, some essence. When we introspect we find not only a sense of freedom but a sense of being a certain kind of person who makes decisions of certain kinds. Also, can we really ignore science and what it tells us about how we work, including our brains? If you have a brain disease, you don't go to an existentionalist.
One argument in favour of Libertarianism concerns gaps in causation. There is at least one gap in the causal chain - at the very beginning. If one, why not lots? Is the notion of uncaused events really so absurd? If not, why not free will?
Compatibilism is the other alternative to Hard Determinism. It is also known as Soft Determinism because it does not try to deny that our decisions are caused, but it claims that determinism and free will are compatible, they can co-exist. The basic idea is that for an action to be my action it has to have been caused by my desires or volitions. It is free in so far as it wasn't caused by anything outside me - I was not physically forced or constrained by another person or an outside force. I could have acted differently if my desires had been different, but they were my desires and so the action was my action, the result of my decision. My free choice, albeit one constrained by my desires, which were, of course, themselves connected to the causal chain. This accords with out common-sense notion of choice, and with our ideas about morality and moral responsibility. I must take responsible for the actions that were caused by my desires.
Problem is, what counts as constraint? Is being constrained by my desires, caused perhaps by factors of which I am unaware, really compatible with freedom? My actions derive from my desires which derive from my character which derives from my genes and upbringing, etc. Is that really freedom? It still doesn't really explain our choices - "explain" in the sense not of "accounting for" but in the sense of "justifying". We want rational explanations, not causal ones, based on our thinking not our bodily processes. A rational explanation would provide the right kind of constraint. We would do the same thing again because we would make the same rational choice again because it was the right choice in the first place. Being a rational person means not being wobbly in our decision-making, but also being free to make bad decisions too.
So it is not clear than Compatibilism gives us what we really want. We want a theory that can account for our sense that we can rationally over-ride our desires, etc. Harry Frankfurt has proposed a theory according to which our basic "first-order" desires (eg for a cigarette) can be controlled by our "second-order" desires (not to want to want a cigarette) - by our desires about our desires. We do not have to be wanton and give in to every passing whim. We can resist the doughnut! Frankfurt says this is what free will is. This is what you are: the controlling, censoring mechanism. This theory explains why you are willing to accept a degree of pain and boredom (revison?) in order to gratify your longer term higher-order desires and purposes. We can train ourselves to ignore desires that don't fit in with our higher order desires.
Trouble is, what makes these second-order desires more you than the first-order ones? Where do they come from? Are they not just as caused (genetics, culture) as the others? The theory makes it still a matter of luck whether you can resist temptation or not. It doesn't seem to help that much with the question of moral responsibility. If someone has limited second-order control over his or her basic desires, can s/he be blamed when s/he (dangerously) gratifies them? May be the theory helps to explain our psychology a little, but it doesn't solve the philosophical issues.
So, what are you? As a human - a machine or a person with autonomy, freedom? As a philosopher - a Hard Determinist, a Libertarian or a wishy-washy Soft Determinist? Me, I'm a marshmallow.
Libertarians include dualists who, like Descartes, believe the mind is a non-physical substance (spiritual) and is therfore not subject to laws of nature - it is essentially free.
The problem with this is how to account for the interaction of the physical body and the non-physical mind. If we want the mind to cause the body to behave in a particular way (eg pick up the pen), how does the mental message connect with the physical body? Through the brain? OK, but that doesn't help: the brain is still physical. Likewise, in reverse, how can bodily events (accidents) cause a mental event (pain)? Surely only two physical things or events can interact causally.
Also, there is plenty of evidence that mental events depend on the physical brain. If we damage our brains, we can lose certain mental abilities, even consciousness. Then there's the problem of God. Dualism claims the mind is non-physical, spiritiual, supernatural. This implies God, and God is omniscient, which means He must know what we are going to do in the future, which means it must already in some sense be determined, pre-destined. So there is a question mark over Dualism's ability to deliver genuine freedom.
Libertarians aren't all substance dualists, so the problems with Dualism don't affect all kinds of Libertarianism. But all kinds must put some constraints on our freedom to act, for two reasons. 1) We need to act consistently rather than totally randomly in order to have a unique character, personality, identity. 2) We need our actions to be determined, or at least influenced, by rational considerations - reasons for choosing A rather than B. You could argue that for any particular decision, there is always just one most rational option, so the more rational we are, the more we are determined (influenced) by the compulsions of rationality. Does this mean that very rational and intelligent people are in some ways less free than others?
One interesting attempt to produce a radically Libertarian philosophy was Jean-Paul Sartre's Existentionalism (1940s/50s). Our existence precedes our essence. Infact we have no essence, no essential characteristics. We choose our own natures. We are 100%responsible for our lives. We are nothingness, not confined or defined by human nature. But we suffer from "bad faith", the illusion that we are fixed, determined in various ways. We fear responsibility, we are made giddy by our freedom. Existensionalism, like all forms of Phenomenology, starts from the cogito (I think, therefore I am): what's most certain is that I exist, rather than that matter and the laws of nature exist. Our starting point should be our freedom, not physics.
The trouble with this is that most of us do feel that we have some kind of nature, some essence. When we introspect we find not only a sense of freedom but a sense of being a certain kind of person who makes decisions of certain kinds. Also, can we really ignore science and what it tells us about how we work, including our brains? If you have a brain disease, you don't go to an existentionalist.
One argument in favour of Libertarianism concerns gaps in causation. There is at least one gap in the causal chain - at the very beginning. If one, why not lots? Is the notion of uncaused events really so absurd? If not, why not free will?
Compatibilism is the other alternative to Hard Determinism. It is also known as Soft Determinism because it does not try to deny that our decisions are caused, but it claims that determinism and free will are compatible, they can co-exist. The basic idea is that for an action to be my action it has to have been caused by my desires or volitions. It is free in so far as it wasn't caused by anything outside me - I was not physically forced or constrained by another person or an outside force. I could have acted differently if my desires had been different, but they were my desires and so the action was my action, the result of my decision. My free choice, albeit one constrained by my desires, which were, of course, themselves connected to the causal chain. This accords with out common-sense notion of choice, and with our ideas about morality and moral responsibility. I must take responsible for the actions that were caused by my desires.
Problem is, what counts as constraint? Is being constrained by my desires, caused perhaps by factors of which I am unaware, really compatible with freedom? My actions derive from my desires which derive from my character which derives from my genes and upbringing, etc. Is that really freedom? It still doesn't really explain our choices - "explain" in the sense not of "accounting for" but in the sense of "justifying". We want rational explanations, not causal ones, based on our thinking not our bodily processes. A rational explanation would provide the right kind of constraint. We would do the same thing again because we would make the same rational choice again because it was the right choice in the first place. Being a rational person means not being wobbly in our decision-making, but also being free to make bad decisions too.
So it is not clear than Compatibilism gives us what we really want. We want a theory that can account for our sense that we can rationally over-ride our desires, etc. Harry Frankfurt has proposed a theory according to which our basic "first-order" desires (eg for a cigarette) can be controlled by our "second-order" desires (not to want to want a cigarette) - by our desires about our desires. We do not have to be wanton and give in to every passing whim. We can resist the doughnut! Frankfurt says this is what free will is. This is what you are: the controlling, censoring mechanism. This theory explains why you are willing to accept a degree of pain and boredom (revison?) in order to gratify your longer term higher-order desires and purposes. We can train ourselves to ignore desires that don't fit in with our higher order desires.
Trouble is, what makes these second-order desires more you than the first-order ones? Where do they come from? Are they not just as caused (genetics, culture) as the others? The theory makes it still a matter of luck whether you can resist temptation or not. It doesn't seem to help that much with the question of moral responsibility. If someone has limited second-order control over his or her basic desires, can s/he be blamed when s/he (dangerously) gratifies them? May be the theory helps to explain our psychology a little, but it doesn't solve the philosophical issues.
So, what are you? As a human - a machine or a person with autonomy, freedom? As a philosopher - a Hard Determinist, a Libertarian or a wishy-washy Soft Determinist? Me, I'm a marshmallow.
Free Will and Determinism: Introduction
What is freedom? Not in the political sense, but in the sense of our ability to make free decisions. Are we machines? Can we ever over-ride our programming? Our bodies, including our brains, work like everything else in nature by cause and effect. But is there, in humans at least, something beyond this which makes us genuinely free? In other words, do will have free will or are we physically determined?
Obviously the answer makes a real difference to how we view ourselves, what we think a person is, how we approach our futures. It also, of course, affects our attitude to morality. Should we hold people responsible for their behaviour? If not (because they have not freely chosen to behave as they did), should we punish them?
The white snooker ball hits the red snooker ball and they each go off in certain directions and stop. Repeat the event exactly and the same consequences will be repeated. Even a leaf twirling in a breeze isn't free. Its apparently random movements are actually the result of complex causes. But you, when you make a choice, is your choice causally determined? Of course, you may have good reasons for your choice - you prefer A to B, or you can't afford B - but we must be careful not to confuse reasons with causes. Reasons are rational, not physical. They can be ignored.
If you think all our actions are physically caused, either by physical events in our bodies of which we are unaware or by mental states, such as desires, which themselves have physical causes, then you are a (physical)determinist. There are other kinds of determinism - eg religious and logical - but we are interested in physical or causal determinism. This is a scientific concept. Everything in the universe obeys the laws of nature: everything that happens can be explained purely in terms of cause and effect. Each cause was itself caused. Every event is connected by a long chain of causes to...the first cause. Everything is completely predictable, or would be if we had perfect knowledge. Some things are unpredictable due to complexity - and that may include human behaviour - but in theory even we are part of the causal chain. So when we think we are making a free decision, we are deluded. This is the claim made by "hard" determinists. Whatever we think our reasons for decisions are, our volitions, intentions, purposes, etc., what is really happenening is that physical causal mechanisms (most immedidiately of course, in our brains and other body parts)are causing us to behave in certain ways.
In response to this we can question the nature of causation, as Hume did - he argued it was merely a question of our human habit of expecting one thing to follow another when we have seen that happen a few times. (We never see a physical event that we can say is the cause, only smaller and smaller events occurring under maginification.) Also, we can refer to quantum physics and the unpredictability of subatomic particles. But these points don't really affect hard determinism. After all, scientists are getting better and better at explaining and predicting human behaviour, discovering paterns, accounting for behavioural characteristics in terms of brain events; and there is some evidence (eg from Libet) that messages are sent out to our limbs by our brains before we have made a conscious decision to move them - this would suggest that our feeling of freedom is illusory.
On top of the neurological and other biological causes affecting our behaviour, there is evidence that culture also has a causal effect on us - ie our environment, upbringing, religion, etc. This is still to be counted as physical because it is about patterns of behaviour, dispositions, being created in the brain during our formative years. Culture contributes to our "hard-wiring".
So, if hard determinists are right, you are pretty much just a very complex machine. It means your AS level results are already inevitable. There's nothing you can do about it. Even if you decide to work harder, that will only be because you are already predisposed to make the decision to work harder. Oh, well!
Obviously the answer makes a real difference to how we view ourselves, what we think a person is, how we approach our futures. It also, of course, affects our attitude to morality. Should we hold people responsible for their behaviour? If not (because they have not freely chosen to behave as they did), should we punish them?
The white snooker ball hits the red snooker ball and they each go off in certain directions and stop. Repeat the event exactly and the same consequences will be repeated. Even a leaf twirling in a breeze isn't free. Its apparently random movements are actually the result of complex causes. But you, when you make a choice, is your choice causally determined? Of course, you may have good reasons for your choice - you prefer A to B, or you can't afford B - but we must be careful not to confuse reasons with causes. Reasons are rational, not physical. They can be ignored.
If you think all our actions are physically caused, either by physical events in our bodies of which we are unaware or by mental states, such as desires, which themselves have physical causes, then you are a (physical)determinist. There are other kinds of determinism - eg religious and logical - but we are interested in physical or causal determinism. This is a scientific concept. Everything in the universe obeys the laws of nature: everything that happens can be explained purely in terms of cause and effect. Each cause was itself caused. Every event is connected by a long chain of causes to...the first cause. Everything is completely predictable, or would be if we had perfect knowledge. Some things are unpredictable due to complexity - and that may include human behaviour - but in theory even we are part of the causal chain. So when we think we are making a free decision, we are deluded. This is the claim made by "hard" determinists. Whatever we think our reasons for decisions are, our volitions, intentions, purposes, etc., what is really happenening is that physical causal mechanisms (most immedidiately of course, in our brains and other body parts)are causing us to behave in certain ways.
In response to this we can question the nature of causation, as Hume did - he argued it was merely a question of our human habit of expecting one thing to follow another when we have seen that happen a few times. (We never see a physical event that we can say is the cause, only smaller and smaller events occurring under maginification.) Also, we can refer to quantum physics and the unpredictability of subatomic particles. But these points don't really affect hard determinism. After all, scientists are getting better and better at explaining and predicting human behaviour, discovering paterns, accounting for behavioural characteristics in terms of brain events; and there is some evidence (eg from Libet) that messages are sent out to our limbs by our brains before we have made a conscious decision to move them - this would suggest that our feeling of freedom is illusory.
On top of the neurological and other biological causes affecting our behaviour, there is evidence that culture also has a causal effect on us - ie our environment, upbringing, religion, etc. This is still to be counted as physical because it is about patterns of behaviour, dispositions, being created in the brain during our formative years. Culture contributes to our "hard-wiring".
So, if hard determinists are right, you are pretty much just a very complex machine. It means your AS level results are already inevitable. There's nothing you can do about it. Even if you decide to work harder, that will only be because you are already predisposed to make the decision to work harder. Oh, well!
Friday, 22 May 2009
The best philosophy quote!
For something can be thought that cannot be thought not to exiat. Hence, if that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought not to exist, then that than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is not the same as that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, which is absurd. Something-than-that-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists so truly then, than it cannot be even thought not to exist.
(Anselm)
Wednesday, 20 May 2009
Revision
If anyone wants a revision pack I can send you one via email as I have been creating one for each of the 3 subjects for the up-coming exam on Friday, I have done one on:
Persons
Reason + Experience
Ontological argument etc.
Just leave a comment and I shall c what I can do! =D
Monday, 18 May 2009
Revision
Dear Students
For Friday's exam, please revise Reason and Experience, Persons and the first God unit. I have some handouts that a few of you asked for. The Reason and Experience question is compulsory.
Please read the relevant sections of the textbook. Revise all the topics thoroughly. Remember there will be shorter Part A questions and longer (essay length) Part B questions, where examples and fully developed arguments are required. On the blog, below, you will find posts on Personal Identity, Introduction to Reason and Experience, Rationalism, Empiricism, Criticisms of Empiricism and, lastly, Conceptual Schemes. You may need to click on Older Posts to read the earlier ones. Read them carefully. Make notes from them and from the textbook and other sources. Make sure you understand. This subject is much less about knowledge (although you are expected to know things!) as about understanding and arguing rationally.
Ask me questions via the blog.
Good luck!
For Friday's exam, please revise Reason and Experience, Persons and the first God unit. I have some handouts that a few of you asked for. The Reason and Experience question is compulsory.
Please read the relevant sections of the textbook. Revise all the topics thoroughly. Remember there will be shorter Part A questions and longer (essay length) Part B questions, where examples and fully developed arguments are required. On the blog, below, you will find posts on Personal Identity, Introduction to Reason and Experience, Rationalism, Empiricism, Criticisms of Empiricism and, lastly, Conceptual Schemes. You may need to click on Older Posts to read the earlier ones. Read them carefully. Make notes from them and from the textbook and other sources. Make sure you understand. This subject is much less about knowledge (although you are expected to know things!) as about understanding and arguing rationally.
Ask me questions via the blog.
Good luck!
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